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SYMPOSIUM ON LAW, LITERATURE, AND THE 
HUMANITIES 
INTRODUCTION: CONDUCTING OUR EDUCATIONS IN 
PUBLIC 
Thomas D. Eise1e* 
One definition of the critic-it must be one of the most popular 
ever arrived at ... -is that he is a man who conducts his education 
in public.1 
This symposium grew out of James Boyd White's Marx Lecture, 
given April 21, 1994, at the University of Cincinnati, and this issue 
owes its existence to some happy coincidences with that event. One 
coincidence was the idea occurring to a number of us that, as nice as it 
would be to publish Professor White's thoughts on the Crito in these 
pages of the Law Review, how much nicer still it would be to sur-
round those thoughts, or to follow them, with the thoughts of other 
scholars in the field, showing how these others responded to the text 
discussed by White or to similar texts. The editors of the Law Review 
having endorsed this idea, we invited a number of other scholars to 
share with us their thoughts on any related text or topic that happened 
to be presently engaging their attention (after advising them only in a 
general way about the gist of White's remarks on Plato's work). Our 
initial symposium proposal was, then, that our intellectual exchange 
would not take place during the actual event of White's lecture, but 
rather would amount to a published epilogue to the delivery of his 
lecture. We were pleasantly surprised by the overwhelming positive 
response that our invitations to this "paper" symposium received. 
A second coincidence followed the first, however, and it led to a 
more true symposium's being held. A number of already committed 
symposium participants said that they wished to attend Jim White's 
Marx Lecture, and they further suggested that the College of Law 
might support and coordinate such a gathering. Dean Joseph Tomain, 
Associate Dean Barbara Watts, and Professor John Applegate (the 
faculty advisor to the Law Review) enthusiastically welcomed this sug-
gestion, seeing it as an opportunity to make what had begun as a "pa-
• Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. 
1. MORTON DAUWEN ZABEL. CRAFT AND CHARACTER[:j TEXTS. METHOD. AND VOCA-
TION IN MODERN FICTION at x (1957). 
1 
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per" symposium into a more lively gathering. Here was the chance to 
get law teachers together with students, all of whom were intent upon 
discussing how law, literature, and the humanities might be taught 
productively or otherwise brought together. With this institutional un-
derwriting in place, members of the Law Review editorial board and 
staff then managed, tirelessly and selflessly, to turn this opportunity 
into an actuality. 
Given the time of year and the press of other commitments, it was 
. foreseen (and it happened) that some of the people writing for the 
symposium issue would not be able to attend the Marx Lecture and its 
associated activities. But other of the symposiasts did manage to rear-
range their schedules so as to attend the Lecture. One of the results of 
this unexpected tu'rn of events is reproduced here in the form of a 
roundtable discussion that took place the morning after Professor 
White's Marx Lecture. This roundtable was unrehearsed and un-
scripted, and we hope that the spontaneity of our exchanges is cap-
tured to some extent in the transcription published here. Indeed, this 
hope for preserving some of the vitality of our gathering pervades the 
entire symposium, which took on a life and a shape all its own. Its 
vitality emanates centrifugally from the lives and the forcefulness of 
those who participated in the symposium, but it is equally shaped, I 
think, by the centripetal force-fields generated by the texts and topics 
that we discussed. At least, this is how I conceive what took place at 
the College of Law this past April as well as what takes place in the 
writing published here.2 
We gathered as the result of several felicitous coincidences, then, in 
a way that was not fully planned or calculated; what issued was a set 
of conversations and texts indicative of the variety of ways that we 
responded to the evocations and provocations provided to us by Profes-
sor White and each other's company. I would like to think that this 
seemingly haphazard process and the ensuing cacophony of voices 
characterize some of the strengths of interdisciplinary work in the law. 
These strengths include the following: the willingness to allow a per-
son to discover and pursue his or her own way through the field, re-
sponding to what he or she finds most relevant or pressing; the encour-
agement to entertain thoughts and possibilities about law (to say 
2. Whether these critical terms of characterization, using figures drawn from physics and 
physical theories of attraction and divergence, help to capture the forces of attraction and diver-
gence at work in the writings that follow, I cannot know, But I do wish to acknowledge here the 
influence of Northrop Frye's book on the theory of literary criticism, Anatomy of Criticism, 
which uses the terms "centrifugal" and "centripetal" in its attempt to discuss certain movements 
in various literary works, genres, and structures. See, e.g., NORTHROP FRYE, ANATOMY OF 
CRITICISM[:] FOUR ESSAYS 75,341 (1957). 
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nothing of life more generally conceived or articulated) that may have 
been unanticipated when one began his or her inquiries (whatever they 
may be); and the penchant for putting things together with law that 
may, at first (or at last), appear to be inapplicable or inapposite, and 
yet that illuminate some aspect or omission of the law by comparison 
or contrast. These are only a few of the attributes of writing in the 
"law and ... " field, but I hope that they are sufficient to suggest that 
interdisciplinary work cultivates in its practitioners a willingness to se-
riously entertain various unanticipated insights or juxtapositions. In 
this regard, interdisciplinary work in law may be said to be work that 
is consciously unplanned or underdetermined, even serendipitous. One 
works in uncontrolled conditions, hoping for unanticipated gains .. So, 
work in this field is, in the best sense, opportunistic. And are good 
.lawyers not the same? Is this not a capacity that we wish to train our 
students to develop: how to spot opportunities that the facts or the 
words of the law provide and how to make the most of them? 
If interdisciplinary writers are-or must be-opportunistic, seeing 
possible ways to be negotiated where others see blind alleys, seeing 
connections where others see divisions (and so forth), then such writers 
also must be exploratory or experimental. 3 They must be willing to 
take a chance, to risk a metaphor or to propose a reading that might 
not pan out, that might prove to be unhelpful, misleading, or empty. 
Such risks must be run if we are ever to discover what can be made 
from the materials of the law and the other disciplines with which it is 
mixed and matched. And the best way to illustrate this necessity (and 
to reveal it as a necessary condition of our work) is to take some 
chances, to propose some contestable readings, to pursue some intima-
tions. This we have done here. 
Professor James Boyd White begins the series of readings and pro-
3. Cynthia Ozick, in her second collection of essays, suggests that, in this respect, the 
writer of critical essays operates in the same mode as does the writer of short stories. Essays are, 
she says, more ad hoc, more provisional or conditional, than we may be willing or inclined to 
grant. 
An essay is rarely seen to be a bewitched contraption in the way of a story. An 
essayist is generally assumed to be a reliable witness, sermonizer, lecturer, 
polemicist, persuader, historian, advocate: a committed intelligence, a single-
minded truth-speaker . 
. . . [E ]ssays are expected to take a "position," to show a consistency of tem-
perament, a stability of viewpoint. Essays are expected to make the writer's case. 
Sometimes, of course, they do .... Yet most essays, like stories, are not designed 
to stand still in this way. A story is a hypothesis, a tryout of human nature under 
the impingement of certain given materials; so is an essay. After which, the mind 
moves on. Nearly every essay, like every story, is an experiment, not a credo. 
CYNTHIA OZICK. METAPHOR AND MEMORY: ESSAYS at ix-x (1980). 
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posals by suggesting a new way to read Plato's Crito. For White, the 
traditional reading of this dialogue treats it as a disguised philosophical 
treatise on the authority of law, replete with a set of arguments made 
by the Athenian laws themselves (the Nomoi) meant to convince Soc-
rates that, despite the urging of his student-friend Crito, Socrates 
should not try to escape the death sentence given him by his Athenian 
jurors. But, in White's view, this reading ignores almost everything 
else about the dialogue, other than the central set of speeches by the 
Nomoi, as though everything leading up to and away from these 
speeches is mere dramatic window-dressing, a kind of frivolous froth 
meant by Plato to prepare our palates for the hard-to-digest philosoph-
ical argumentation on the authority of law. In contrast, Professor: 
White suggests that we take seriously the dialogue as a whole, as a 
composition, all of the parts of which are meant by Plato to have 
meaning or effect. For example, White asks that we take seriously the 
setting where the dialogue takes place, the relationship enacted and 
imagined between Socrates and Crito, and Socrates' report of a strange 
dream that he has had just before Crito visits him in his jail-cell (and 
so on). White's point might be explained like this: we cannot under-
stand the speeches of the Nomoi without understanding their place 
within the dialogue as a whole. And when this placement is attempted, 
according to White's reading, we 'discover that (as Plato has composed 
his dialogue) Socrates is less interested in refuting the speeches of the 
Nomoi (although they may be vulnerable to refutation philosophically) 
than he is in exemplifying his life's lessons by once more showing a . 
student-friend how a life of integrity might be lived to the end. 
Professor Peter Teachout offers us a carefully considered response to 
White's lecture, one that accepts the general ways of reading recom-
mended by Professor White, yet rejects the specific conclusions that 
White draws from his way of reading the Crito. For Teachout, as use-
ful an antidote as White's way of reading this dialogue may be to the 
traditional analytical-philosophical reading, the result simply is not 
convincing. Teachout argues, while citing details from both the Crito 
and other Platonic dialogues to support his reading, that White fails to 
paint a portrait of Socrates that is consistent with Socrates' commit-
ment to a "well-governed" life, both private and public. Professor 
Teachout has a different way of taking the central speeches of the 
Nomoi, which allows him to paint a portrait of a Socrates less despair-
ing and impoverished than the one portrayed by White in his lecture. 
So here we have two readers of the same text, both imploring us to 
read the text in context, but each proposing a slightly different context 
in which to place the relevant text and each finding a rather distinctive 
and different pattern emerging from the Platonic puzzle. And we read-
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ers are asked to assess these two readings, to learn what they can mean 
to us. While Professors White and Teachout are conducting their edu-
cations in public, we are meant to continue ours in the privacy of.our 
experience of reading them reading Plato. 
From these competing readings of the Crito, we proceed in alpha-
betical order through the contributors to this issue. 
Professor Nancy Cook studies the benefits that might accrue to legal 
studies if we find it possible to include works of fiction and poetry 
within the canon of legal scholarship. The call here (as I hear it) is for 
us to recognize that explicitly literary works may allow us to investi-
gate and test legal forms, legal genres, legal concepts, and legal rules 
(et cetera) in ways that nonliterary works do not permit. In particular, 
she claims that gender or racial assumptions embedded in the law 
could become more available to comprehension and criticism if we used 
the critical resources made available to us through fiction and poetry. 
This is a proposal that Professor Cook advances, not based on a claim 
to infallibility, obviousness, or inevitability, but rather as a friendly 
suggestion from someone who works in both legal and literary fields. It 
is an invitation to experiment with various genres of writing in the 
hope that they may yield insight into the law (what it is, and what it 
may leave out). 
Professor Judy Cornett offers us a reading of Richardson's Clarissa, 
tying its themes to certain aspects of eighteenth-century epistemology 
and the English rules of evidence. On Cornett's reading, the heroine of 
Richardson's novel is systematically deceived by the apparent evidence 
of her senses. This result indicts various epistemological principles 
made famous by Locke, to be sure, but it also indicates certain weak-
nesses or omissions in traditional English rules of evidence. Cornett 
finds this parallel to exist in part because both Locke's epistemological 
principles and the eighteenth-century English rules of evi~ence are 
products of male-dominated thought, which assumes a male's preroga-
tives and powers as they then stood and which, thereby, leaves females 
and their "experience" out of the picture. She leaves us with the sug-
gestion that, to the extent that principles or rules (epistemological or 
legal) are designed for a specific gender, they may prove unreliable or 
unworkable when applied to or exercised by the omitted gender. 
Professor Clark Cunningham offers us something different than the 
reading of a specific text. Rather, he suggests that one of the values of 
interdisciplinary studies of law taught in law school is the ability of 
such studies to engage law students in bringing together various as-
pects of their lives and experiences. Interestingly enough, Cunningham 
illustrates this point in ·a Socratic way, by offering us several samples 
from his students' papers in his seminar entitled, "Law as Language, 
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Law as Literature." He allows the students to speak for themselves 
through their papers, and the suggestion is that the act of witnessing 
their own process of education will itself help to educate us about what 
law is or what it can be and about what legal education is or what it 
can be. 
My own contribution to this symposium is a reading of the Meno in 
the context of thinking about the extent to which we truly and fairly 
can say that, at least some of the time, we law teachers use the Socratic 
method. While I am among those who wish to make such a claim, and 
who continue to value this way of teaching, it has bothered me that we 
seem to share a very thinly described version, or vision, of Socrates' 
teaching. I do not pretend that we can gain a perspicuous view of it by 
examining a single dialogue; rather, my essay is offered as a beginning 
serious step toward a more adequate description of how Socrates 
taught (at a certain time, in a certain place, given certain questions 
and interlocutors). Anything more general or global will have to come 
later, I think, and will have to build upon such efforts to understand 
specific instances of Socratic teaching (as well as instances of other 
types or styles of teaching). For my part, I find in the Meno a style of 
teaching that begins with a goal of disillusioning the student, but that 
ends with a more positive goal (what Plato called "recollection"). How 
the negative and positive sides of such teaching can be made consistent 
with one another and whether they can be managed without extraordi-
nary dissonance are, to my mind, among the continuing mysteries of 
Socrates' example and of the craft of teaching. I am sure that I do not 
know their answer. 
Professor Amy Kastely begins her essay with a reference to opera, 
implicitly reminding us that there is no apparent limit (beyond our 
resourcefulness) to our ability to illuminate the law by calling upon the 
resources of other disciplines. Kastely first shares with us her experi-
ence of reading Toni Morrison's short story, "Recitatif," in which she 
finds herself wanting to know the racial identity of two friends talking 
in the story, and yet in which she also asks herself why this piece of 
information matters (or should matter) to her-as a woman, as a white 
. person, as a reader. (And do we find ourselves wanting to know the 
same thing in our experience of reading either this short story or any 
other piece -of non-legal or legal literature? If so, then why does or 
why should it matter( to us? What is it that we wish to know, or expect 
to learn, from such information? How do we intend to use this infor-
mation?) Professor Kastely suggests that her experience is indicative of 
what she calls an assumption of "the white norm and the black 
Other," both in literature and in law. To bolster this thought, Kastely 
then proceeds to read some judicial opinions and some contract theory 
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in which she finds the same subtle, yet quite fundamental, assumption 
being expressed or implied (often in the statement of the facts, but also 
sometimes in the law's response). She leaves us with the question 
whether interdisciplinary studies of the law might help to bring us to a 
consciousness of such troubling assumptions and, thus, to make us 
more ready to confront them. 
Professor L.H. LaRue offers us a reading of Plato's Gorgias. The 
challenges that Socrates and Plato bring against rhetoricians (and, 
hence, lawyers) are real, according to LaRue, and he wants his stu-
dents to face them openly. Do we have any adequate response to the 
charges that our profession sells itself to the highest bidder, that we try 
to make the weaker argument seem to be the stronger, and so on? If 
we do not, then Professor LaRue wants us to realize that we do not 
have an adequate response and to think about what that fact means for 
us and for our profession. But he equally wants us to grapple with the 
text of the Gorgias, which is problematic both in terms of what it 
means (Plato and Socrates do not manage much crystal clarity in their 
argumentation, story-telling, and hypothetical conjecturing) and in 
terms of whether or not its claims against rhetoric and its practitioners 
are true. 
Professor David Papke takes a different tack, returning us to the 
theme of the authority of the law, this time placing it not in ancient 
Greece but in turn-of-the-century America, and finding the question 
posed not by a text but by the figure of socialist Eugene Debs. Papke 
argues that Debs began with a traditional American faith in the law 
and its justice, but that he came to be converted from that position to a 
far more radical faith by his union-organizing activities and his pro-
fessed socialism. Where (if anywhere) did Debs locate the authority of 
the law, or its potential authority over us, and how did Debs come to 
see the law as not being its own guarantor of its authority or legiti-
macy? These are Papke's basic questions, and he pursues them with a 
wealth of detail that one might hope for from a scholar with a Ph.D. 
in American Studies. It is another example of how interdisciplinary 
work may be able to illuminate issues of legality (philosophical, social, 
or otherwise). 
Professor Teresa Godwin Phelps deals with Jane Austen's Persua-
sion, as another way of investigating where authority over ourselves 
comes from. In particular, she asks (because Austen's novel asks): 
What is a code-legal, moral, or social-such that we feel bound to 
obey it? And why might we find ourselves justified in obeying (or dis-
obeying) such a code? Since the dominant picture of law that we have 
inherited from the dominant Anglo-American legal philosophy (legal 
positivism) is that of law as a system or set of rules-a code, I think 
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that Professor Phelps is exactly right to suggest that Persuasion is a 
book that bears reading in law school. She offers us the view that the 
authority of a legal code depends not only on its status or position (as 
positivism has insisted since its inception) but also on its reception by 
its subjects, whose character is thereby tested and put into question. 
(Have they responded fairly to the demands or advice of the law? Has 
the law responded fairly to them, to their needs and concerns?) This is 
not a vision of the law either easy to identify or easy to articulate, 
because it requires us to examine, in detail, the reasons and emotions 
suffusing our responses to the law, and these are hardly less difficult or 
complex than the legal codes and systems of authority themselves. 
Then criticism of literature and of law ends up imitating the complex-
ity of its subjects. This strikes me as a fair bargain: fairly given, fairly 
gained. Do we accept it? 
I conclude with the thought that what we are witnessing here (in the 
field of law, literature, and the humanities), and what some of us are 
participating in, is less a movement and more a process of mutual edi-
fication! And it is this thought that guided me in taking as my prefa-
tory tag Morton Zabel's remark about critics' conducting their educa-
tion in public. Our symposium issue offers to its readers a number of 
critics (of literature and of the law, as well as of other things) con-
ducting their educations in public. Is this a useful way to conduct 
ourselves? 
Zabel, in the remark with which I began, goes on to say the 
following: 
Leaving aside the possibility that there are worse things being con-
ducted in public these days than an education; leaving aside also the 
likelihood that if the serious pursuit of literature is anything it is an 
education, one may say that the nature of the critic's work makes this 
[conducting one's education in public 1 inevitable. If he is qualified by 
any degree of serious enthusiasm for his task, he is not content to 
remain a silent reader. He commits himself to print; he neglects to 
wait until full maturity, infallibility, or final judgments are arrived 
at:1 
Put aside Zabel's exclusively masculine inflection of his maxim, and 
think about what it' suggests for any woman or man who wishes to 
comment on a text or a topic. I understand it this way: Criticism is 
inevitably tentative and exploratory, because it is an offering of one's 
views about something or someone. These views can change as the 
4. I am not the first to say or suggest this. See James Boyd White, Law and Literature: 
"No Manifesto", 39 MERCER L. REV. 739 (1988). 
5. ZABEL, supra note 1, at x. 
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processes of reading, writing, criticizing, arguing, sharing, comparing, 
and judging (et cetera) proceed; they transform our understanding. 
As Zabel goes on to suggest, critics seem compelled, in their "serious 
enthusiasm" for their critical task, to share their views with others, 
with anyone who will listen or pay attention. Criticism becomes, then, 
a matter of exposing to public scrutiny, and possibly to public rejec-
tion, the seWs readings, views, interpretations, and reactions. As tenta-
tive and contestable as these may be, they constitute an attempt to dis-
cover or create a shared reality with others, one that becomes 
shareable, perhaps, because we come to share a way of looking and 
seeing, a way of thinking, or a way of expressing ourselves and con-
ducting our educations in public. (This seems to me to be a part of 
what Socratic teaching is meant to do: both to encourage such perform-
ances of self-exposure and criticism, and to make them inescapable as-
pects of one's education.) 
If I begin by observing that what counts most in such critical activity 
is having or gaining the knack of being able to generate such offerings 
from the self, I find that I want immediately to juxtapose with this 
claim the paradox that these performances are not meant or intended 
solely, or even primarily, for the benefit of the self. This is why critics 
(including those of the law) conduct their educations in public. These 
performances are available to others, and they are an attempt to invite 
others to contribute their own critical performances. I take such efforts 
of solicitation to reveal-however partial or inchoate the revelation 
may be-that it is the sharing of reality (or of the world) that makes it 
a reality (or a world) in the first place, including the reality and the 
world of the law. 
HeinOnline -- 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 10 1994-1995
